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1 Introduction
Latin America is an area of the world in constant change, sometimes 
peaceful, and sometimes not. Political and social changes ultimately find 
their way into the constitutional framework of Latin American jurisdic-
tions. An examination of constitutional law developments in the region 
since 1999, when the new Venezuelan Constitution was passed, shows that 
there are many common aspects to these constitutional developments. 
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Accordingly, this article seeks to identify the new constitutional philoso-
phies underlying the most important changes that occurred in this period 
of time and determine their commonalities.
This brief examination does not address every Latin American 
country, or every aspect of constitutional law. The countries sampled 
have been selected based on their strong departure from constitutional 
tradition; the far-reaching effects of their political, social, and economic 
aims; or because of the high geopolitical relevance of such jurisdictions. 
The areas of focus cover the economic, social, and political bases of the 
State; the organization of the State and the distribution of power among 
the branches of government; and the constitutional protection of per-
sonal freedoms. The article also highlights some new areas of attention 
on constitutional drafting in the region, including the rights of indige-
nous peoples, third-generation rights, and the validity and influence of 
international law at the domestic level. 
In this context, this survey focuses on the new constitutions of 
Venezuela (1999); Ecuador (2008); and Bolivia (2009). It also encompas s-
es constitutional amendments passed in Mexico in 2008, 2009, and 2011, 
related to constitutional guarantees, criminal justice, government cor-
ruption, kidnapping, organized crime, secular character of the country, 
and human rights. The study further explores the constitutional changes 
that occurred in Colombia in 2009 and 2012 related to the recognition 
of third-generation rights, to political parties and movements, to the 
peace process, and to military jurisdiction. Reference is also made to 
Peru’s constitutional amendment of 2009 concerning the organization 
of the legislative branch. Furthermore, two constitutional decisions con-
cerning presidential succession, one from Nicaragua (2009), and another 
from Colombia (2010), are examined. Similarly, this survey analyzes the 
Ecuadorian Referendum of 2011 that introduced amendments to the 
judicial branch. Finally, the constitutional aspects of the political trial 
against former president Lugo (2012) and the succession of Hugo Chavez 
after his death (2013) will be examined. 
2 What is New in Constitutional Law in Latin America?
A first glance at recent constitutional law developments shows 
several trends, described below:
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2.1 Re-Foundational Aspirations 
It was the Constitution of Venezuela of 1999 that set the stage for 
new political aspirations to rebuild society. Its preamble declares that the 
supreme goal of the Venezuelan people is to 
refound the Republic to establish a society that is democratic, participatory, 
and protagonist, multiethnic and pluricultural in a State of justice, federal 
and decentralized, that consolidates the values of freedom, independence, 
peace...1
Following this trend, the Constitution of Bolivia of 2009 provided 
in its preamble,
[W]e left behind our colonial, republican, and neoliberal past. We assume 
the historic challenge to build collectively our Social Unitarian State of 
Communal Plurinational Law, that integrates and articulates the purpose 
of advancing toward a Bolivia that is more democratic, productive, and that 
carries, inspires, and is engaged in peace.2 
The preamble continues, saying straightforwardly that “we ... build 
a new State ... [and] we ... refound Bolivia.”3
Coupled with the refoundational aim is a strong reaction against 
perceived “foreign influence.” This has been an issue long present in 
Latin American constitutionalism, but only recently has it emerged so 
strongly. In Bolivia, again, the Constitution expressly includes a prohi-
bition against the installation of foreign military bases in the national 
territory.4 Renewed efforts at implementing Simón Bolívar’s aspiration 
of making Latin America a single political unit in the form of Latin 
American integration are also noticeable in recent constitutions.5
1  1999 CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA (hereinafter, 1999 CONST. OF 
VENEZUELA), Gaceta Oficial del jueves 30 de diciembre de 1999, No 36.860, available at: <http://www.
asambleanacional.gob.ve/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=24728&Itemid=238&lang
=es>. All translations in this article are those of the author unless otherwise stated.
2  REPÚBLICA DEL BOLIVIA CONSTITUCIÓN DE 2009 (hereinafter, 2009 CONST. OF BOLIVIA), available at: 
<http://consuladoboliviano.com.ar/portal/node/119>.
3  Id.
4  Id. art. 10(III).
5  2008 CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DEL ECUADOR (hereinafter, 2008 CONST. OF ECUADOR) pmbl., 
available at: <http://www.asambleanacional.gov.ec/documentos/Constitucion-2008.pdf>; 2009 CONST. 
OF BOLIVIA art. 265(I). 
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2.2  Rupture in the Historical Relationship between the Catholic 
Church and the State
With a few historical exceptions,6 Catholicism has been the constitu-
tionally-enshrined official religion of most Latin American countries since 
their independence. Profession of the Catholic faith was even required 
in some cases for high officials to assume office.7 Venezuela signaled a 
departure in 1999 when it established that, “the State shall guarantee 
freedom of religion and cult”,8 and that “freedom of conscience and faith 
and in the teaching of religion shall be recognized and guaranteed... 
without any dogmatic imposition”.9
Bolivia’s 2009 Constitution, in turn, recognizes “freedom of religion 
and spiritual beliefs”,10 and that the “State is independent from religion”.11 
The Constitution goes a step further in replacing the Catholic religion 
as the moral foundation of the Bolivian society by affirming that the 
“state assumes and promotes as ethical principles of the plural society, 
aboriginal mottos such as: ‘don’t be lazy, a liar, or a thief ’”.12
Ecuador’s Constitution, in this vein, recognizes “all diverse forms 
of religiosity and spirituality, and the wisdom of all cultures”.13 It too 
reaffirms the “right to practice, keep, change, or profess publicly or 
privately, each one’s religion or beliefs [and asserts the State’s duty] to 
protect voluntary religious practices, as well as the expressions of those 
who do not profess any religion”.14
Following this trend, in 2012 Mexico — a country with one of 
the most catholic societies in the world — amended Article 40 of its 
Constitution15 establishing that Mexico is a “secular”16 country. When 
6  E.g., the case of Mexico under Porfirio Díaz, who served as the country’s President in the early nineteenth 
century.
7  E.g., the case of former President Carlos Saúl Menem of Argentina, first elected to the Presidency in 1989, 
who converted from Islam to Catholicism in order to be sworn in because the Constitution of Argentina 
then required the President be a Catholic. Constitutional amendments adopted in 1994 eliminated this 
requirement.
8  1999 CONST. OF VENEZUELA art. 59.
9  Id. art. 86.
10  2009 CONST. OF BOLIVIA art. 4 (emphasis added). 
11  Id.
12  Id. art. 8.
13  2008 CONST. OF ECUADOR, pmbl.
14  Id. art. 66, No. 8.
15  Mexico’s Official Gazette of the Federation, available at: <http://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?cod
igo=5280961&fecha=30/11/2012>.
16  Article 40 of the Mexican Political Constitution states that “it is the will of the Mexican people to constitute 
itself as a representative, democratic, secular, and federal Republic, comprised by free and sovereign states 
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discussing the bill at the Mexican House of Representatives, one represen-
tative argued that “granting an express secular character to our Mexican 
State would both continue and confirm the path that our legislators posed 
when drafting the Constitution of 1857, reaffirmed by the legislators of 
the Constitution of 1917, because it has been proved, in our collective 
experience and in the experience of other nations, that secularism is an 
effective formula for coexistence of pluralism”.17 
2.3 Moralistic Overtone in the New Constitutional Principles
Recent constitutional developments in Venezuela and Ecuador, to 
name the principal players, are imbued with philosophical and ethical 
calls to goodness, harmony, social integration, virtue, and other moralistic 
goals. The Constitution of Ecuador, for example, created an institutional 
apparatus called “National Equality Councils,” and other special mecha-
nisms “for the control of public ethics and individual moral behavior”.18
In 1999 Venezuela had already institutionalized a fourth branch 
of government attached to the traditional three, called the “Citizens’ 
Power” (Poder Ciudadano), whose responsibility is to “prevent, investigate, 
and punish conduct that violates public ethics and administrative morals 
[and to] promote education as a creative process of the citizenry, as well 
as solidarity, liberty, democracy, social responsibility, and labor”.19 The 
Citizens’ Power is exercised by the Republican Moral Council, composed 
of the National People’s Defender, the Attorney General, and the General 
Comptroller.20
2.4 Promotion of Indigenous Causes
The promotion of the causes of indigenous peoples is an area 
where much innovation has occurred in Latin American constitutional 
law. The pantheistic philosophical bases of this new movement are clearly 
concerning its internal regime; but united in a federation established in accordance with the principles of 
this fundamental law”. 
17  Ruperto Patiño, La Reforma del Artículo 40 Constitucional [The Amendment of Article 40 of the 
Constitution], Biblioteca Jurídica virtual del Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas de la UNAM 418, available 
at: <http://biblio.juridicas.unam.mx/libros/7/3101/28.pdf>.
18  Id. art. 176.
19  1999 CONST. OF VENEZUELA art. 274.
20  Id. art. 273, para. 2.
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stated in the constitutions of Ecuador and Bolivia.21 The preamble of the 
Ecuadorean Constitution “celebrates the ‘Pacha Mama’” — an indigenous 
concept referring to planet earth — of which, it says, “we are all a part”. 
The Constitution of Bolivia, in turn, deifies the planet earth under the 
term, “sacred Mother Earth”.
This ideological conception is intimately connected with a clear 
repudiation of the “colonial, republican, and neoliberal State”.22 The 
Venezuelan charter “condemns all forms of imperialism, colonialism, 
and neocolonialism”,23 while the Ecuadoran Constitution galvanizes 
the “Ecuadoran people” as the “heirs of the social fights for the libera-
tion from all forms of domination and colonialism”.24 The Bolivian 
Constitution openly speaks about the existence of original indigenous 
farming peoples (pueblos indígenas originarios campesinos), who existed 
“prior to the colonial Spanish invasion”.25 
Several consequences emanate from these new developments:
2.4.1 Constitutional Recognition of the Multiplicity and Plurality of 
the New Nations
The recognition of racial diversity in the country has accompanied 
the recognition of the primacy of the aboriginal element. In Bolivia, at 
least, new electoral districts have been formed to guarantee the repre-
sentation of indigenous populations.26 The territorial and administrative 
decentralization of the Bolivian State is guaranteed at the regional, local, 
municipal, and other autonomous levels, and is to be achieved based 
on the presence of indigenous populations.27 The self-government of 
local indigenous populations is now constitutionally protected and 
encouraged.28 
21  See 2009 CONST. OF BOLIVIA, ch. IV, “Rights of Original Indigenous Farming Peoples and Nations”.
22  Id., pmbl.
23  1999 CONST. OF VENEZUELA art. 416, para. 8. This language is repeated in article 255(2) of the Constitution 
of Bolivia, which states that one of the principles guiding the negotiation and execution of international 
treaties is “[t]he rejection and condemnation of all forms of... colonialism, neocolonialism, and imperialism”.
24  2009 CONST. OF BOLIVIA, pmbl.
25  Id. art. 30, §2.
26  Id. art. 146(VII). It is also worth mentioning that in Bolivia’s neighboring country, Peru, a constitutional 
amendment bill that would create the Special Electoral District for Native Communities and Original Peoples 
is pending before the Peruvian Congress. See Bill 04332/2010-CR, of Sept. 23, 2010.
27  2009 CONST. OF BOLIVIA arts. 270, 303(2) & 391(3).
28  Id. art. 2.
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Venezuela recognizes the preservation of indigenous peoples’ 
social, political, and economic organizations, as well as their culture, 
traditions and ancient customs, languages, and religions.29 This consti-
tutional recognition extends to their “ethnic and cultural identity, values, 
spiritualities, and sacred and cult places”.30 The Venezuelan Constitution 
also guarantees aboriginal representation in the National Assembly and 
at other subnational levels.31 Finally, the composition of the National 
Assembly includes representation quotas for indigenous communities.32 
2.4.2 Official Language
Consistent with tradition, in 1999 Venezuela recognized Castilian 
as the official language of the country. However, it stated that indigenous 
languages are “also of official use”.33 Bolivia went a step further and 
stated that, besides Castilian, thirty-seven other indigenous languages 
are “official languages of the State” as well.34 The actual implications of 
these innovations remain to be seen.35
2.4.3 Aboriginal Medical Practices
Venezuela gave constitutional recognition to indigenous medical 
practices, and prohibited the registration of patents involving their 
ancestral resources and their knowledge related to genetic resources.36 
Traditional and natural aboriginal medical practices are also included 
in the governmental guarantee of the right to health care in Bolivia.37 
The Constitution of that country also protects the “original and ancestral 
29  1999 CONST. OF VENEZUELA art. 119. In the context of advancing the indigenous cause, the Constitutional 
Court of Colombia rendered a decision in 2010 approving an affirmative action program implemented 
by a Colombian university for persons with indigenous ancestry. Case T-110/10, Acción de tutela contra 
la Universidad Industrial de Santander, Ministerio de Educación y el ICETEX, available at: <http://www.
corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2010/t-110-10.htm>.
30  1999 CONST. OF VENEZUELA art. 121.
31  Id. art. 125.
32  Id. The Seventh Transitory Provision of the Constitution enumerates the criteria for the election of indigenous 
members of the National Assembly, and of State and Municipal Legislative Councils.
33  Id. art. 9.
34  2009 CONST. OF BOLIVIA art. 5(I).
35  In Peru, a constitutional amendment bill that would amend article 48 of the Constitution to officially 
recognize aboriginal languages is pending before the Peruvian Congress. See Bill 03649/2009-CR, of 
Nov. 5, 2010. 
36  1999 CONST. OF VENEZUELA art. 124.
37  2009 CONST. OF BOLIVIA art. 35(II).
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coca, in its natural nonnarcotic state, as cultural patrimony, [as a] natural 
renewable resource of Bolivia, and as a factor of social cohesion”.38
2.4.4 Creation of Parallel Judicial Systems for Aboriginal Peoples
In an unprecedented move, the Bolivian Constitution created an 
independent judicial system parallel to, and with the same hierarchical 
level of, the ordinary judicial system called “Original Farming Indigenous 
Jurisdiction” (jurisdicción indígena originario campesina), which is in charge 
of providing civil and criminal justice for indigenous peoples.39 Several 
important questions — such as who is subject to this system, how to 
differentiate indigenous from non-indigenous parties, and whether in-
digenous persons enjoy more privileges than non-indigenous persons 
— remain unresolved by the Constitution and need to be developed 
through implementing legislation.40 Indigenous representation at the 
Pluri-National Constitutional Tribunal is mandated by the Constitution.41
3 The Traditional Family
Even the most progressive of the Latin American constitutional 
regimes have provided constitutional protection to the traditional family 
as the fundamental nucleus of society.42 Venezuela and Bolivia provide 
constitutional recognition of marriage as between a man and a woman.43 
Both countries also recognize stable, de facto unions between a man and 
a woman as having the same legal consequences as marriage.44 
4 Political Participation and Political Parties and Movements 
Political participation is an area where constitutional activity is 
exceedingly strong in Latin America. Two innovations are worth men-
tioning in this field. First, in 2003 Colombia amended its Constitution 
to set minimum requirements for political entities to gain legal existence 
38  Id. art. 384.
39  Id. art. 179(I), (II).
40  For more information on this new judicial system, see Bret Gustafson, Manipulating Cartographies: 
Plurinationalism, Autonomy, and Indigenous Resurgence in Bolivia, 82 ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 985(32) 
(Sept. 22, 2009).
41  2009 CONST. OF BOLIVIA art. 199(II). 
42  Id. art. 62.
43  Id. art. 63(I); 1999 CONST. OF VENEZUELA art. 77.
44  2009 CONST. OF BOLIVIA art. 63(II); 1999 CONST. OF VENEZUELA art. 77.
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(2 percent of legally issued votes),45 with some exceptions for electoral 
districts holding minorities. The measure is effective for elections taking 
place from 2011 onwards.46 The same amendment provided for partial 
government financial contributions to political parties and movements 
with legal existence,47 and leaves it to the legislature to establish limits 
on electoral campaign expenditures by political parties and movements, 
and on private contributions to political elections.48 Second, Bolivia’s 
Constitution recognized the right of expatriates to vote in presidential 
elections, and in other elections, as determined by law.49
5 Personal Freedoms
Latin American countries have faced endemic problems related 
to corruption and the violation of human rights and freedoms. Recent 
efforts show a clear intent to tackle these phenomena. In the case of 
Mexico, multiple constitutional amendments were enacted in 2009.50 
These reforms instituted constitutional due process protections, modeled 
after the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, concerning 
the person, family, and other matters covered by the constitutional right 
to privacy. Pioneering in Latin America, Mexico recognized a right of 
protection over personal information held by the government. For this 
purpose, it created the writ of habeas data (although not so named in 
Mexico), which allows persons to challenge the information gathered by 
the government about them, with certain exceptions.51 The amendment 
of 2009 requires the finding of probable cause for the issuance of judicial 
arrest orders.52 
45  CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA DE 1991 (hereinafter, 1991 CONST. OF 
COLOMBIA) art. 108, available at <http://www.senado.gov.co/.../images/stories/Informacion_General/ 
constitucion_politica.pdf>.
46  Id. art. 108, para. 1, as amended by Legislative Act No. 1 of 2003.
47  Id. art. 109, para. 1.
48  Id. art. 109, para. 4.
49  2009 CONST. OF BOLIVIA art. 27.
50  CONST. OF MEX. art. 16, as amended Aug. 24, 2009, available at <http://www.ordenjuridico.gob.mx/
Constitucion/cn16.pdf (official website)>.
51  Exceptions are based on considerations of national security, public policy, public safety and health, or the 
protection of third parties’ interests. See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS, 
as amended, Diario Oficial de la Federación, 5 Febrero de 1917 (hereinafter, CONST. OF MEXICO), art. 
16, para. 2, available at http://constitucion.gob.mx/index.php?idseccion=168&ruta=1. “Writ of habeas 
data” is the generally accepted name of the action aimed at protecting this new right in Latin America. 
Other Latin American countries, including Brazil and Colombia, have a similar writ.
52  Id. art. 16, para. 3.
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Constitutional amendments have also entered the era of the pro-
tection of third generation rights — namely, environmental, cultural, 
educational, and economic rights. Venezuela, again, set the tone in 1999 
when it guaranteed the right to universal health care and social security,53 
and it also included an extensive list of labor, employment, and social 
security guarantees,54 and the human right to a “democratic, free, and 
mandatory” education.55 Mexico, for its part, guarantees the constitu-
tional right to the enjoyment of culture, cultural rights, and cultural 
manifestations.56 Colombia mandates the State to provide health care 
and environmental clean-up.57 Ecuador’s Constitution contains an entire 
section on consumers’ rights.58 Finally, Bolivia crystallized the State’s 
obligation to guarantee food safety by means of “healthy, adequate, and 
sufficient nutrition for all the population”.59 Bolivia’s constitutional rights 
in the areas of education, health care, labor, consumerism, and social 
security are crafted along the lines of the Venezuelan Constitution as 
well. Interestingly, the Bolivian Constitution prohibits the privatization 
or concession of public health goods or services, or of social security 
benefits.60
6 Reforms in Criminal Procedure and Sentencing 
Perhaps the most meaningful criminal procedure reform in Latin 
America took place in Chile in 2005, with the complete replacement of 
the ancient inquisitorial criminal procedure system by an accusatorial 
system.61 Mexico followed suit and in 2008 welcomed a new accusatorial 
system as well.62 Mexico’s new procedure is generally conceived along the 
lines of U.S. criminal procedure, with the notable exclusion of a jury.63 
53  1999 CONST. OF VENEZUELA arts. 83-85.
54  Id. arts. 87-97.
55  Id. art. 102.
56  CONST. OF MEXICO as amended by Decree of April 30, 2009.
57  1991 CONST. OF COLOMBIA art. 49.
58  2008 CONST. OF ECUADOR arts. 52-55.
59  2009 CONST. OF BOLIVIA art. 16.
60  Id. arts. 38(I), 45(VI).
61  See Kirtland C. Marsh, To Charge or Not to Charge, That is Discretion: The Problem of Prosecutorial 
Discretion in Chile, and Japan’s Solution, 15 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 543 (2006); Rafael Blanco et al., Reform 
to the Criminal Justice System in Chile: Evaluation and Challenges, 2 Loy. U. Chi. Int’l L. Rev. 253 (2005); 
Carlos de la Barra, Chile: Adversarial vs. Inquisitorial Systems: The Rule of Law and Prospects for Criminal 
Procedure Reform in Chile, 5 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 323 (1998).
62  CONST. OF MEXICO art. 20.
63  For more on the differences between the civil law inquisitorial criminal system and the Anglo-American 
accusatorial criminal procedure, see Rogelio Pérez-Perdomo & John Henry Merryman, “Civil Procedure”, in 
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The amendment also included sweeping procedural guarantees during 
criminal prosecutions — including the constitutional right to be released 
on bail and restrictions on incommunicado detentions — and renewed 
efforts to prosecute organized crime.64 This new criminal system is to be 
implemented gradually, along with the implementation of a new juvenile 
criminal system.65
The Mexican amendments include the prohibition against station-
ing military personnel in private homes without the authorization of the 
homeowner, with certain exceptions.66 They also allow Mexican nationals 
serving sentences in foreign countries to be brought to Mexican territory 
to complete their sentences, with their prior consent and in accordance 
with international treaties.67 Finally, the Constitution abolished the death 
penalty and prohibited severe corporal punishment, excessive fines, 
confiscation, and any other unusual and far-reaching (trascendentales) 
punishments.68 
Pursuant to Article 22 of its Constitution,69 and in an effort to put an 
end to its internal armed conflict — that has lasted almost half a century, 
leaving millions of casualties — Colombia passed a new legislation in 
2012,70 named “Legal Framework for Peace” that created the transitory 
Article 66 of the Colombian Constitution. This new legislation allows 
the Colombian Government to establish a transitional criminal justice 
system for judging members of illegal armed groups (among them left-
wing guerillas and right-wing paramilitary groups) and government 
agents for crimes committed during the armed conflict.71 This initiative 
THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 
112-24 (J. Merryman et al. eds., 2007). See also Robert Kossick, Litigation in the United States and Mexico: 
A Comparative Overview, 31 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 23 (2000).
64  CONST. OF MEXICO art. 20(B)(II).
65  Id. art. 18.
66  Id. art. 16, para. 17.
67  Id. art. 18, para. 7.
68  Id. art. 22, para. 1.
69  Article 22 of the Colombian Constitution states that “the peace is a right and a binding duty”. 
70  Legislative Act Nº 1 of 2012, Colombian Official Gazette No. 48.508 of July, 31, 2012, available at: <http://
www.secretariasenado.gov.co/senado/basedoc/cp/acto_legislativo_01_2012.html>.
71  First paragraph of Transitory Article 66 of the Colombian Constitution prescribes that “the instruments of 
transitional justice will be exceptional and will have the main goal of facilitating the end of the internal 
armed conflict and achieving a stable and long-lasting peace, with guarantees of non-recurrence and 
safety for all Colombians; to guarantee in the greatest possible extent, the rights of victims to the truth, 
justice, and compensation.
A statutory law can authorize that, within the framework of a peace agreement, a different treatment be 
given to the different illegal armed groups that have participated in the internal armed conflict, and also 
to the agents of the State, regarding their participation in that conflict”.
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is intended to solve the legal situation of thousands of persons that had 
demobilized from these armed groups, by prioritizing the prosecution 
of the most serious cases, which would incentivize more demobilization 
of members of those groups.72 
The new constitutional provision, in its paragraph fourth, allows 
Congress to pass legislation: (i) to determine selection criteria for the 
criminal investigation against the main responsible of crimes against 
humanity, genocide, and war crimes that were systematically perpetrat-
ed; (ii) establishing the conditions and requirements under which the 
suspension of the execution of sentence would proceed; (iii) establishing 
cases where extrajudicial sanctions, alternative penalties, and special 
ways of execution and compliance of the penalties may be applied; and 
(iv) allowing the conditional waiver of criminal prosecution of all cases 
that were not selected.73 
This amendment has been criticized both for Colombian jurists 
and Human Rights Organizations because it is considered that it allows 
Congress to enact statutes that leave unpunished crimes when committed 
by people that were not the main responsible — but who had direct parti-
cipation on those crimes — which violates international human rights law 
and humanitarian law.74 Moreover, on April 5, 2013, Colombia’s General 
Attorney filed a constitutional lawsuit requesting the Constitutional Court 
72  Press Conference Room of the Colombian Senate, Acto legislativo que establecerá un nuevo marco legal 
para la paz fue radicado en el Congreso [Legislative Act that will establish a New Legal Framework for 
Peace is now being discussed in Congress], available at: <http://www.senado.gov.co/sala-de-prensa/
noticias/item/12294-acto-legislativo-que-establecera-un-nuevo-marco-legal-para-la-paz-fue-radicado-en-
el-congreso>. 
73  In order to apply the above-mentioned measures, the fifth paragraph of Article 66 of the Colombian 
Constitution sets that the beneficiaries must comply the following requirements: “leave the weapons, 
assume their responsibility, contribute to establishing the truth and to the integral compensation of 
victims, release the kidnapped people, and remove the minors that were illegally recruited and are 
under the control of armed groups outside the law”. In addition, paragraph tenth of the same provision 
establishes that “the application of transitional justice instruments to armed groups outside the law that 
had participated in hostilities, will be limited to those who demobilize collectively within the framework 
of a peace agreement, or individually according to the procedures established under the authorization of 
the National Congress”.
74  Comisión Colombiana de Juristas, Comentarios al “marco jurídico para la paz” [Comments on the “Juridical 
Framework for Peace”], available at: <http://www.coljuristas.org/documentos/actuaciones_judiciales/
comentarios_marco_juridico_2012-06-04.pdf>; See also Letter from José Miguel Vivanco, on behalf of 
Human Rights Watch, to the Presidents of the Colombian Senate and House of Representatives on May 
1, 2012, available at: <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/Carta%20de%20HRW%20
sobre%20Marco%20Juridico%20para%20la%20Paz.pdf>.
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to declare the unconstitutionality of certain terms mentioned above 
(“main responsible”, “systematically perpetrated”, and “all cases”) since 
the current provision would violate international obligations of Colombia 
regarding the investigation and sanction of international crimes, which 
could activate the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.75 
Furthermore, in 2012 Colombia passed another amendment to the 
Constitution (particularly to Articles 116, 152, and 221) that expanded the 
military criminal jurisdiction.76 The amendment basically creates a new 
tribunal — Tribunal de Garantías Penales (Criminal Guarantees Tribunal) 
— that is in charge of (i) controlling the fulfillment of guarantees in 
any criminal investigation or procedure against a member of the public 
force; (ii) controlling the criminal accusation against members of the 
Public Force, in order to guarantee the fulfillment of the material and 
substantive admissibility requirements to initiate a criminal trial; and 
(iii) solving the jurisdiction disputes between ordinary tribunals and military 
criminal tribunals.77 Therefore, a previous procedure was established to 
control the criminal accusation against a member of the military.
In addition, new Article 221 of the Colombian Constitution estab-
lishes that the violations to International Humanitarian Law will always 
be under the jurisdiction of the military courts, unless the violations are: 
(1) crimes against humanity; (2) genocide; (3) forced disappearances; 
(3) extrajudicial executions; (4) sexual violence; (5) torture; or (6) forced 
displacement. These and other reforms introduced by this constitutional 
amendment have been criticized by the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights (IACHR) who stated that “on the basis of the inter-
American standards that require States to judge human rights violations 
in courts of ordinary jurisdiction, various countries of the region have 
adopted reforms to significantly restrict the scope of military jurisdiction 
75  Procuraduría General de la Nación, Procurador general de la Nación, Alejandro Ordóñez Maldonado, 
solicita a la Corte Constitucional que se declaren inexequibles expresiones del Marco Jurídico para la Paz 
[The General Attorney of the Nation, Alejandro Ordoñez Maldonado, request to the Constitutional Court 




76  Legislative Act Nº 2 of 2012, Colombian Official Gazette No. 48.657 December 28, 2012, available at: 
<http://www.secretariasenado.gov.co/senado/basedoc/cp/acto_legislativo_02_2012.html>.
77  2012 Colombian Const. Article 116.
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[...] the constitutional reform on military criminal jurisdiction would 
reverse that progress and would constitute a serious setback that 
jeopardizes the right to justice for victims of human rights violations”.78 
The IACHR also criticized that grave human rights violation, like “war 
crimes and arbitrary detentions”, are under the jurisdiction of military 
tribunals.79
7 Changes Affecting the Branches of Government
7.1 Executive Branch
7.1.1 Presidential Reelection 
Two recent cases illustrating the dynamics of Latin American poli-
tics are noteworthy, one affecting an administration with a progressive tilt, 
where the possibility of reelection of an incumbent president succeeded, 
and the other concerning a conservative government, where it failed. 
The first case is that of Nicaragua, where in 2009 the Constitutional 
Chamber of the Supreme Court issued a decision allowing the incumbent 
President to run for reelection.80 The novelty of the decision resides in the 
fact that it partially repealed language that had banned such reelection. 
The Court found that the prohibition of reelection contradicted, among 
other constitutional guarantees, the principles of unconditional equality 
in the exercise of the political rights of the office holders to participate in 
the political affairs of the country, the principle of proportionality, and 
the principles of sovereignty and national self-determination. All these 
principles, the Court held, are in accordance with international human 
rights conventions by which Nicaragua is bound. The argument about 
equality centered around the fact that under the Constitution the only 
grounds for limiting the reelection bid of elected officials are age, criminal 
conviction, or incapacity. The restriction on reelection was established, 
the Court also stated, by the “derivative constitutional power” reflected in 
a 1995 constitutional amendment, and not by the original constitutional 
framers.81 By extending its powers beyond those expressly granted by 
78  Organization of American States, IACHR Expresses Concern over Constitutional Reform in Colombia, 
available at: <http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2013/004.asp>.
79  Organization of American States, IACHR Expresses Concern over Constitutional Reform in Colombia, 
available at: <http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2013/004.asp>.
80  Sentencia No. 504, Supreme Court of Justice of Nicaragua, LA GACETA – DIARIO OFICIAL [OFFICIAL 
GAZETTE], Jan. 18, 2011. 
81  Id. (citing Law 192 of July 4, 1995, Partial Amendment Law to the Political Constitution of Nicaragua, 
art. 13).
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the original framers — that is, by restricting the “right” of only certain 
government officials to run for reelection based on the aforementioned 
grounds — the derivative constitutional power violated the principle of 
sovereignty protected by the same Constitution, the Court said.
In another interesting turn of constitutional reasoning, the Court 
held that the preamble to the Constitution prevails over any constitu-
tional provisions that contradict the philosophical bases expressed in its 
preamble, stemming from “the revolutionary conquests achieved by the 
people”, whether in words or in spirit. 
The second case involves Colombia, whose Constitutional Court 
invalidated a law calling for a constitutional referendum on the question 
of whether incumbent Presidents were allowed to run for a third term.82 
The Court, following the same line of reasoning as the Nicaraguan court, 
reiterated its precedents holding that the derivative constitutional power 
may amend the Constitution but not substitute it with a new document. 
The Court also found a series of irregularities related to the financing 
of the campaign leading to the adoption of the law and concluded that 
this violated the principles of transparency and political pluralism that 
govern elections, according to the applicable election laws. Finally, the 
Court pointed out procedural abuses in the legislative process leading 
to enactment of the reelection bill. In sum, the sitting president was not 
allowed to run for a third term.
7.1.2 Other Amendments Concerning the Executive Branch
Other reforms meriting attention are (1) the incorporation into the 
Constitution of Mexico of the President’s obligation to render a written, 
annual state of the nation report to Congress;83 and (2) Bolivia’s adoption 
of constitutional provisions that allow the incumbent President to run 
for a third term84 and subject the President to removal by Congress.85 
82  Decision of February 26, 2010 invalidating Law 1354 of 2009, available at: <http://www.corteconstitucional.
gov.co/relatoria/2010/c-141-10.htm>.
83  CONST. OF MEXICO art. 69, para. 1, as amended by Amendment of August 15, 2008.
84  2009 CONST. OF BOLIVIA art. 168.
85  Id. arts. 161(7), 171.
34 Dante Figueroa
7.1.3 Constitutional Issues Concerning the Executive Branch
In 2012, Paraguay experienced difficult moments when President 
Fernando Lugo was subject to a political trial (impeachment) under 
Article 225 of the Paraguayan Constitution,86 which ended with President 
Lugo been removed from its office. President Lugo was accused of several 
charges, but the event that triggered the political trial against him was 
the case known as “Killing in Curuguaty”, where a group of indigenous 
land squatters ambushed — with firearms — the Paraguayan Police offi-
cers that were trying to evict them from the lands, resulting in eleven 
people dead and one dozen injured.87 Following the removal of Lugo, 
Paraguay’s Congress and new government were very criticized by several 
Latin American presidents, whom argued that the political trial did not 
have minimum standards of due process, and that the entire situation 
was a cover coup d’état.88
In Venezuela the recent death of Hugo Chávez caused a constitu-
tional dispute regarding who had to replace him until a new president 
is elected. On the one hand, Article 231 of the Venezuelan Constitution 
prescribes that in order to take office the elected president has to swear 
before the National Assembly on January 10th of the first year of his term. 
On the other hand, the first paragraph of Article 233 of the Venezuelan 
Constitution establishes that death is considered an absolute absence 
of the President, while its second paragraph prescribes that when the 
86  Article 225 of the Paraguayan Constitution establishes that: 
“The president of the Republic, the Vice President, cabinet ministers, justices of the Supreme Court of 
Justice, the attorney general, the public defender, the comptroller and the deputy comptroller general 
of the Republic, and members of the Superior Electoral Court may be forced to undergo impeachment 
proceedings for malfeasance in office, for crimes committed in office, or for common crimes. The Chamber 
of Deputies, by a two-thirds majority, will press the respective charges. The Senate, by a two-thirds absolute 
majority, will conduct a public trial of those charged by the Chamber of Deputies and, if appropriate, 
will declare them guilty for the sole purpose of removing them from office. In cases in which it appears 
that common crimes have been committed, the files on the respective impeachment proceedings will be 
referred to a competent court.” Translation available at: <http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/pa00000_.html>.
87  Allan R. Brewer-Carías, ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE POLITICAL TRIAL AGAINST PARAGUAYAN 
PRESIDENT FERNANDO LUGO, 2 available at: <http://iaba.org/blog/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Opinion-
of-Prof.-Brewer-Car%C3%ADas-on-the-Constitutionality-of-the-Political-Impeachment-in-Paraguay.pdf>; 
See also Nahem Reyes & Jorge Llano, La Destitución de Fernando Lugo y sus Repercusiones en el Hemisferio: 
Algunas Reflexiones Iniciales [The Removal of Fernando Lugo and Its Repercussions in the Hmisphere: Some 
Initial Reflections], Consejo Venezolano de Relaciones Internacionales, 3 (2012), available at: <http://www.
covri.org/resources/uploads/10-07-2012/4ffc86780fd61.pdf>.
88  See Fox News, Paraguay Faces Criticism in Latin America for Removing President Fernando Lugo, available 
at: <http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2012/06/24/paraguay-faces-criticism-in-latin-america-for-
removing-president-fernando-lugo/#ixzz2Pc14NfnS>.
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absolute absence of the President occurs before he or she takes office, 
there has to be new elections within the subsequent thirty days, and in 
the meantime the President of the National Assembly shall assume as 
President of the Republic. 
President Chávez could not be sworn before the National Assembly 
because he was treating his cancer in Cuba. On January 9, 2013 the 
Venezuelan Supreme Tribunal of Justice established that President Chávez 
did not have to take office again because he was the current president 
— thus, there were no vacancy in the executive branch — and President 
Chávez could be sworn in a posterior date established by the National 
Assembly once the impediments disappear.89 
Nevertheless, President Chávez was never sworn when he came back 
to Venezuela on February 18, 2013, due to his serious health problems. 
Later on, on March 5, 2013, Chávez passed away without been sworn in 
before the National Assembly. Therefore, in accordance with the plain 
language of the Constitution, the President of the Venezuelan National 
Assembly, Mr. Diosdado Cabello should have replaced him as President 
of the Republic. However, the Vice President of the Republic, Mr. Nicolas 
Maduro is the current President of Venezuela until the elections (he is the 
candidate of the official party and Chávez named him as his successor). 
Maduro was appointed as interim President based on the decision 
of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice of January 9, 2013-, which established 
that despite the fact that the Chávez was not sworn in on January 10th, 
2013, he continued to be in office. It was considered that in this situation 
the second paragraph of Article 233 of the Constitution did not apply 
(rule concerning the absolute absence of the president before he or she 
takes office); instead, it was argued that since the Supreme Tribunal held 
that Chávez was in office when he died, paragraph third of Article 233 
was the one that had to be applied,90 which prescribes that if the absolute 
89  Tribunal Supremo de Justicia Expediente Nº 12-1358, available at: <http://www.tsj.gov.ve/decisiones/scon/
enero/02-9113-2013-12-1358.html>. The Tribunal considered that under the “Principle of continuity of 
the Public Authorities, “the Principle of Preservation of the Popular Will”, and “the Principle of Continuity 
of the Administration”, the Venezuelan President was able to continue in his office. 
90  Allan R. Brewer-Carías, CRÓNICA XIII. SOBRE LA CONSOLIDACIÓN, DE HECHO, DE UN GOBIERNO DE 
SUCESIÓN DEL PRESIDENTE H. CHÁVEZ CON MOTIVO DEL ANUNCIO DEL FALLECIMIENTO DEL PRESIDENTE 
CHÁVEZ EL 5 DE MARZO DE 2013 [Chronicle XIII About the Consolidation of Fact of a Government that 
Succeed President H. Chávez, in Relation with the Announcement of the Death of President Chavez on 
March 5, 2013] 7 (2013), available at: <http://www.allanbrewercarias.com/Content/449725d9-f1cb-
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absence of the President occurs within the first four years of his term, 
the Vice President shall assume as President of the Republic.
7.2 Legislative Branch
Peru’s constitutional law has also touched the legislative branch 
in important ways. A constitutional amendment approved in 2009, 
which comes into force for the 2011 electoral process, provides that only 
Peruvians by birth may run for Congress. The tenure of legislative office 
is fixed at five years, and candidates for the Presidency of the Republic 
cannot become candidates for Congress.91 
Unlike Venezuela, where the legislative power resides in a unicamer-
al National Assembly92 in keeping with the French model,93 Bolivia still 
adheres to the principle of a bicameral Congress.94 It has also removed 
all types of immunity for members of Congress,95 following the pattern 
established by Honduras in 2003.96 
7.3 Judicial Branch
The judiciary has likewise been subject to significant changes in 
recent times in Latin America. As stated in Section 6, above, Mexico 
overhauled its criminal procedure system and created an integral justice 
system for juveniles, which has yet to be implemented. In the case of 
Bolivia, the Constitution has injected the appointment of members of 




91  Ley No. 29,402, El Peruano (official gazette), Sept. 8, 2009, available at: <http://www.congreso.gob.
pe/ntley/Imagenes/Leyes/29402.pdf> (amending article 90 of the 1993 Constitución Política del Perú 
(hereinafter, Const. of Peru), available at: <www.tc.gob.pe/legconperu/constitucion.html> (includes 
reforms through Oct. 2005)).
92  1999 CONST. OF VENEZUELA art. 186.
93  See CONSTITUTION OF FRANCE OF 1791, available at: <http://sourcebook.fsc.edu/history/
constitutionof1791.html>, Title III, “Of Public Powers”, para. 3 (unofficial source). See also J. Merryman et 
al., “Sources of Law and the Judicial Process in Civil Law Systems”, in THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: EUROPE, 
LATIN AMERICA, AND EAST ASIA 208 (J. Merryman et al. eds., 1994) (stating that “a cardinal tenet of 
the French was that all law-making power was to be vested in a representative assembly”). Costa Rica, 
Nicaragua, and Peru also follow the French unicameral model.
94  2009 CONST. OF BOLIVIA art. 145.
95  Id. art. 152.
96  Decree No. 175-2003 of Oct. 28, 2008, art. 1, repealed art. 200 of the CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA 
REPUBLICA DE HONDURAS of 1982, which had granted general immunity to the Deputies of the National 
Congress. 
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fact, these magistrates are elected for only one six-year term by universal 
suffrage in a process that includes a preselection of the candidates by the 
legislative branch, which is called the “Plurinational Legislative Assembly” 
(Asamblea Legislativa Plurinacional).97 Venezuela also possesses a judicial 
appointment process that is mired in politics. In effect, the members of 
the Supreme Tribunal of Justice are selected in a complex procedure that 
requires the intervention of the Citizens’ Power, which prepares a roster 
with the candidates for the final decision of the National Assembly.98 
The National Assembly retains the power to remove the members of the 
Supreme Tribunal of Justice at any time.99
On February 21, 2011, the Ecuadorian Government called for 
Referendum and Popular Consultation that took place on May 7, 2011, 
which had five questions that sought to amend the Constitution. Two 
of these questions were related to the Judiciary: (i) whether substituting 
the entire Judicature Council100 for a Transitional Judicature Council, 
comprised of three members — one appointed by the President, one by 
the National Assembly, and one by the Function of Transparency and 
Social Control, — which would exercise the functions of the Judicature 
Council and it would restructure the judiciary, within a 18 months dead-
line; (ii) whether to modify the composition of the Judicature Council, 
by amending the Constitution and reforming the Organic Code of the 
Judicial Function.101 
A group of scholars criticized this bill because in their opinion it 
would affect the separation of powers between the judicial branch and 
97  2009 CONST. OF BOLIVIA art. 182.
98  1999 CONST. OF VENEZUELA arts. 264, 265.
99  Id. 
100  Article 254 of the Ecuadorian Organic Code of the Judicial Function defines the Judicature Council as 
“... the exclusive organism of government, administration and discipline of the Judicial Function [Judicial 
Branch], which comprise: jurisdictional organisms, administrative organisms, auxiliary organisms, and 
autonomous organisms”. In addition, under sections 3 and 6 of Article 264 of the same statute, the Council 
is in charge of the “appointment and evaluation of the Justices of the National Court of Justice and judges 
of the Provincial Courts, judges of first level, District Attorneys, Fiscal Agents and District Defenders”, and 
of “establishing the politics for the selection, tenders of opposition and merits, permanency, discipline, 
evaluation [,] and education and training of the officers of the Judicial Function, in accordance with the 
general politics issued by the Advisory Council”.
101  Consejo Nacional Electoral de Ecuador, Resultados del Referéndum y Consulta Popular 2011 [Results of 




the executive branch.102 They based their opinion in the fact that the 
Transitional Judicature Council was comprised of three members, two of 
them appointed by the executive and legislative branches, which would 
imply that “President Correa and his political movement would have an 
absolute control over the Technical Commission that will be in charge 
of restructuring all the judicial function in a deadline of 18 months”.103 
They considered that the situation “... constitute a clear violation of the 
obligations of ‘separation and independence of public powers’ under 
article 3 and 7 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter”.104 For in-
stance, Section 3 of Article 181 of the Constitution, introduced by the 
2011 amendment, prescribes that the Council is in charge of “leading 
the procedures aimed to select judges and other officials of the Judicial 
Function, and also for their evaluation, promotion, and sanction...”.105 
Despite the criticism, both questions were approved by the people with 
a 52, 02% and 52, 66%, respectively.106
8 Constitutional Emergencies
Latin America has a long history of being governed by autocratic 
rulers pursuant to emergency provisions established or allowed by 
their constitutions. Colombia, for example, was ruled under emergency 
provisions for thirty years between 1958 and 1988.107 In tandem with 
this approach, judicial interpretations of declarations of emergency 
102  Letter of Douglas Cassel, Pier Paolo Pigozzi Sandoval, Hernán Salgado Pesantes, and Pablo Dávila Jaramillo, 
to the Executive Secretary of the Inter-American Comission on Human Rights on January 28, 2011, 
concerning the Referendum and Plebiscite in Ecuador, available at: <http://www3.nd.edu/~ndlaw/cchr/
news/Pier/2_LetterSPIACHR.pdf>.
103  Letter of Douglas Cassel, Pier Paolo Pigozzi Sandoval, Hernán Salgado Pesantes, and Pablo Dávila Jaramillo, 
to the Executive Secretary of the Inter-American Comission on Human Rights on January 28, 2011, 
concerning the Referendum and Plebiscite in Ecuador, 2 available at: <http://www3.nd.edu/~ndlaw/cchr/
news/Pier/2_LetterSPIACHR.pdf>.
104  Letter of Douglas Cassel, Pier Paolo Pigozzi Sandoval, Hernán Salgado Pesantes, and Pablo Dávila Jaramillo, 
to the Executive Secretary of the Inter-American Comission on Human Rights on January 28, 2011, 
concerning the Referendum and Plebiscite in Ecuador, 2 available at: <http://www3.nd.edu/~ndlaw/cchr/
news/Pier/2_LetterSPIACHR.pdf>.
105  Ecuadorian Constitution, Section 3 of Article 181.
106  Consejo Nacional Electoral de Ecuador, Resultados del Referéndum y Consulta Popular 2011 [Results of 
the Referendum and Popular Consultation 2011] 4-9, available at: <http://www.lexis.com.ec/webtools/
biblioteca_silec/documentos/noticias/RESULTADOS%20DEL%20REFERENDUM%20Y%20CONSULTA%20
POPULAR.pdf>.
107  Gabriel L. Negretto et al., Liberalism and Emergency Powers in Latin America: Reflections on Carl Schmitt 
and the Theory of Constitutional Dictatorship, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 1797 (2000).
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have consistently judged them as a “political question,” and therefore 
nonjusticiable.108 
Consequently, constitutional law in the region gives much atten-
tion to the declaration of constitutional emergencies. In Bolivia, this 
power has been granted to the President subject to ratification by the 
legislature.109 In Venezuela, the President may declare a constitutional 
emergency based on political unrest for a period of up to ninety days, 
renewable once for up to ninety days with the previous authorization 
of the National Assembly.110 This Emergency Decree is subject to the 
approval of the National Assembly within eight days after its promulga-
tion and to constitutional review by the Constitutional Chamber of the 
Supreme Tribunal of Justice.111
9 Economic Model
When it comes to the determination of their economic models 
Latin American nations have oscillated between liberalism and central 
planning since their inception as independent nations. 
In this context, the case of Bolivia is striking. On the one hand, 
the Bolivian Constitution contains strong provisions guaranteeing free 
initiative and a free market. On the other hand, it greatly increases the 
intervention of the government in the economy. Examples of the first 
situation include multiple constitutional provisions on the recogni-
tion and protection of private initiative in the economy112 (referred to 
else where in the Constitution as “free enterprise and entrepreneurial 
initiative”113), cooperatives,114 and the individual and collective owner-
ship of land.115 Instances of a growing governmental intrusion into the 
economy are reflected in a broad government mandate to administer 
public services and utilities,116 and the outright declaration of natural 
resources and hydrocarbons as the property of the Bolivian people, the 
108  Id. at 5.
109  2009 CONST. OF BOLIVIA arts. 137-138.
110  1999 CONST. OF VENEZUELA art. 338, para. 3.
111  Id. art. 339.
112  2009 CONST. OF BOLIVIA art. 308.
113  Id. art. 311(5).
114  Id. arts. 55, 306(II), 330(II), 351(I), 369(I), 370(II), 378(II) & 406(II).
115  Id. art. 311(II)(2).
116  Id. art. 20(II).
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exclusive administration of which corresponds to the Bolivian govern-
ment.117 The Constitution also prohibits the creation of latifundia.118 The 
corollary to these provisions is the constitutional provision that punishes 
anyone involved in a violation of the constitutional precepts regarding 
the use and administration of natural resources as “guilty of treason to 
the motherland”.119
The aforementioned provisions of the Bolivian Constitution fol-
lowed their equivalents in the Venezuelan Constitution of 1999 almost 
verbatim, in both spirit and letter. Both constitutions, for example, con-
tain a norm providing for the punishment of “economic illicit conduct, 
speculation, entrapment, usury ... and other related crimes”.120 The 
provisions on the recognition of private initiative and the prohibition 
of latifundia are similar as well.121
10 Fight against Narcotrafficking and Organized Crime
The tragic reality of the twin social evils of narcotrafficking and 
organized crime has lately mobilized two of the largest Latin American 
countries, Mexico and Colombia, to take constitutional action. Through 
a 2009 constitutional amendment, Mexico’s Constitution granted powers 
to the federal legislature to issue a general law on kidnapping and to 
establish punishments against organized crime.122
In the case of Colombia, a 2009 constitutional amendment prohib-
its the carrying and consumption of narcotics or psychotropic substances, 
except when medically prescribed, and establishes the government’s 
duty to help addicts recover.123 Another Colombian amendment of the 
same year sets forth penalties for political entities that cover up actions 
of their members convicted during office for crimes related to illegal 
armed groups and narcotrafficking activities, crimes against democratic 
participation mechanisms, or crimes against humanity.124 Finally, the same 
117 Id. arts. 9(6), 349(I).
118 Id. art. 398.
119 Id. art. 124.
120 1999 CONST. OF VENEZUELA art. 114; 2009 CONST. OF BOLIVIA art. 325.
121 Id.
122 Decree of May 4, 2009 (amending CONST OF MEXICO art. 73(XXI), para. 1). 
123 Constitutional Amendment of December 21, 2009, available at: <http://www.secretariasenado.gov.co/
senado/ basedoc/arbol/1001.html> (Colom.).
124 Constitutional Amendment of July 14, 2009, art. 107, available at: <http://www.secretariasenado.gov.
co/senado/ basedoc/cp/acto_legislativo_01_2009.html> (Colom.).
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amendment forbids those convicted of crimes affecting the patrimony 
of the State, crimes related to illegal armed groups and narcotrafficking 
activities, crimes against democratic participation mechanisms, or crimes 
against humanity from running for office, being appointed in govern-
ment positions, and having contracts with the State.125 
11 Fight against Government Corruption
Unfortunately, government corruption is intimately related to the 
phenomena of narcotrafficking and organized crime in the region. Latin 
American nations have reacted by strengthening their constitutional 
frame works to deal with these situations. Mexico is a good example of this 
tendency. In 2009, that country approved a wide-ranging modification 
of the constitutional provisions dealing with the salaries of government 
employees. The amendment provides that these salaries may not be 
reduced,126 or be higher than those of their hierarchical superiors, with 
several exceptions,127 and are subject to an overall ceiling equal to the 
remuneration accorded to the President of the Republic.128 Finally, the 
amendment states that no social security benefits, credits, or loans may 
be granted to government employees without prior budgetary allocations 
by law, presidential decree, or pursuant to labor contracts.129 It leaves it to 
Congress to establish punishments for the violation of these provisions.130
12 International Law and International Relations
The interaction between domestic law and international law has 
been a particular subject of tension in Latin America, particularly after 
World War II. The emergence of the Inter-American Human Rights 
System has posed colossal challenges to the weak democracies of the 
region, and these democracies have reacted in recent times by amending 
their constitutions in order to accommodate the new realities created 
125 Constitutional Amendment of July 14, 2009, art. 122, available at: <http://www.secretariasenado.gov.
co/senado/ basedoc/cp/acto_legislativo_01_2009.html> (Colom.).
126 CONST. OF MEXICO art. 123(IV), as amended by Decree of August 24, 2009 (amending and making 
additions to arts. 75, 115, 116, 122, 123 and 127).
127 Id. art. 127(III).
128 Id. art. 127(II). 
129 Id. art. 127(IV). 
130 Id. art. 127(VI). 
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by the increasing application of international treaties into the domestic 
legal systems with regard to the protection of human rights. 
Argentina first broke ground in 1994 when it granted constitutional 
rank, a status superior to legislative enactments, to enumerated inter-
national human rights treaties. It also allowed Congress to give future 
treaties such status.131 Venezuela’s 1999 Constitution was very prolific in 
incorporating matters of international law into its text as well. In fact, it 
established the government’s duty to guarantee human rights protected 
by international treaties,132 and eliminated the statute of limitations and 
the possibility of amnesty or pardon for serious human rights violations 
and war crimes.133 In addition, the Venezuelan Constitution explicitly 
creates a cause of action for damages in favor of victims of human 
rights violations.134 Finally, in a turn away from international law, that 
Constitution clarifies the “unique, sovereign, and indivisible concept 
of the Venezuelan people”, denying “any effect of the international law 
usage of the word ‘people’”.135
In 2009 Bolivia followed the path previously set by Argentina and 
Venezuela but in rather cryptic language:
[T]he international treaties and conventions ratified by the Plurinational 
Legislative Assembly [Bolivia’s unicameral Congress], that recognize human 
rights, and that prohibit their limitation during Emergency Situations prevail 
in the domestic order. The rights and duties established in this Constitution 
shall be interpreted in accordance with the international human rights treaties 
ratified by Bolivia.136
Also concerning matters related to international law, Bolivia’s 
Constitution contains a novel provision stating that Bolivian citizenship 
is not lost by the acquisition of citizenship in a foreign country.137 The 
131 1994 CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL (hereafter 1994 CONST. OF ARGENTINA), ch. IV, “Powers of Congress,” 
§75, No. 22, available at: <http://www.senado.gov.ar/web/interes/constitucion/cuerpo1.php>.
132 1999 CONST. OF VENEZUELA art. 19.
133 Id. art. 29, para. 2.
134 Id. art. 30.
135 Id. art. 126, para. 2. The Venezuelan Constitution does not specify what concept of “people” provided by 
international law it is referring to. One possibility is the concept contained in the 1989 International Labour 
Organization’s Convention No. 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, 
available at: <http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C169>. The matter remains, however, to be 
determined in the current Venezuelan Constitution.
136 2009 CONST. OF BOLIVIA art. 13(IV).
137 Id. art. 143(I).
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same country, which became landlocked in the late nineteenth century in 
a war against Chile, included a provision in its Constitution enshrining 
its maritime claims of access to the Pacific Ocean as “non-waivable”.138 
In regard to the last constitutional provision, several steps have 
been taken by Bolivia in order to achieve a sovereign access to the sea. 
For instance, on April 5, 2011, a new public entity was created, named 
Dirección Estratégica de Reivindicación Marítima (DIREMAR – Strategic 
Directorate of Maritime Claim)139 whose main task is “to plan, develop, 
and evaluate strategies for the maritime claim”.140 However, the most 
significant measures taken by Bolivia are: (i) the enactment on March 23, 
2013, of a statute that leaves without effect the reservation made by 
Bolivia to Article VI of the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement of 1948, 
also known as “Pact of Bogota”,141 which establishes that the procedures 
contemplated by the treaty are not applicable to disputes that were solved 
by the parties before the treaty took effect;142 and (ii) the announcement 
made by President Evo Morales that his country is going to sue Chile 
before the International Court of Justice.143 
The goal of Bolivia is to challenge the Tratado de Paz y Amistad 
(Treaty of Peace and Friendship) entered into by Bolivia and Chile in 
1904, that is 44 years before the Pact of Bogotá. According to Chile’s 
Secretary of State, the ratification of Article IV prevents Bolivia of filing 
any claim regarding facts that occurred before the date of the afore-
mentioned treaty.144 Nevertheless, Bolivia’s main argument for filing 
138 Id. art. 267(I).
139 DIREMAR, Decreto Supremo Nº 0834 2011, available at: <http://www.diremar.gob.bo/sites/default/
files/D.S._834.pdf>.
140 DIREMAR, Principales Atribuciones [Main Attributions], available at: <http://www.diremar.gob.bo/node/4>.
141 Article VI of the “Pact of Bogotá” establishes that “the aforesaid procedures, furthermore, may not be 
applied to matters already settled by arrangement between the parties, or by arbitral award or by decision 
of an international court, or which are governed by agreements or treaties in force on the date of the 
conclusion of the present Treaty”.
142 Bolivia ratified the treaty, with the reservation of Article VI, on April, 14, 2011. See OAS, Signatories and 
Ratifications American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, available at: <http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/
sigs/a-42.html>.
143 Prensa Palacio de Gobierno Boliviano, Bolivia presentará a La Haya demanda internacional para retornar 
al mar con soberanía [Bolivia will file an international lawsuit before the Hague to recover sovereign 
acces to the sea], available at: <http://comunicacion.presidencia.gob.bo/noticias/noticiasprint.
php?idio=castellano&id=682>.
144 Diario La Segunda, Canciller Moreno: “Hace dos años que hemos perdido el tiempo con Bolivia” [Secretary 




the lawsuit against Chile is that the Tratado de Paz y Amistad of 1904 was 
not freely negotiated by the countries; on the contrary, that Treaty was 
“imposed under duress and threat”145 by Chile. 
Finally, in year 2011, there were important amendments to the 
Mexican Constitution concerning international human rights.146 First, 
there was a change in the nomenclature of the rights consecrated in 
the Mexican Constitution, since they are no longer called “individual 
guarantees”; instead the Constitution now talks about “human rights”, 
which according to an author was intended to adopt the language used 
by the main international treaties about the topic.147 Secondly, the first 
paragraph of Article 1 of the Mexican Constitution now establishes that 
“in the United States of Mexico all people are entitled to the human rights 
recognized in this Constitution and in the international treaties to which 
Mexico is a party [...]”. The second paragraph of the same provision, 
states that “the rules concerning human rights will be construed according 
with this Constitution and with the international treaties about the topic 
[...]”. Accordingly, an author points that after the amendment, the human 
rights pertaining to international treaties ratified by Mexico have the 
same authority than the ones consecrated in the Mexican Constitution.148 
13 Constitutional Amendment Procedures
The mechanism for reforming the fundamental charter of a country 
is crucial to determining the allocation of political power in a society, the 
distribution of wealth, and the overall well-being of its citizens. For that 
reason, this is yet another area that has served as a scenario for heated 
political fights and even violence in the region. Many experiments and 
formulae concerning the amendment of the Constitution have been 
145 Prensa Palacio de Gobierno Boliviano, Morales explica a sectores sociales fundamentos históricos y jurídicos 
de demanda a La Haya [Morales explains to social actors the historical and legal grounds of the lawsuit 
that will be filed before the Hague], available at: <http://comunicacion.presidencia.gob.bo/noticias/
noticiasprint.php?idio=castellano&id=715>.
146 Mexico’s Official Gazette of the Federation, available at: <http://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=
5194486&fecha=10/06/2011>. 
147 Juan N. Silva Meza, El impacto de la reforma constitucional en materia de derechos humanos en la labor 
jurisdiccional en México [The Impact of the Constitutional Amendment concerning Human Rights on the 
Work of Judges in Mexico] Anuario de Derecho Constitucional Latinoamericano 2012 Konrad Adenauer 
Stiftung, 154 (2012).
148 Silva, supra note at 147, 156 (2012).
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tested during Latin American history, and no single system can be said 
to have been foolproof. Accordingly, this area will most likely remain one 
of recurrent interest for Latin American constitutionalism.
Given these considerations, it is worth mentioning several contem-
porary innovations concerning constitutional amendment procedures 
in the region. In the case of Venezuela, initiatives to amend the cons-
titution must have the support of at least 15 percent of those citizens 
registered to vote, 30 percent of the deputies of the National Assembly, 
and the President of the Republic.149 Bolivians, in turn, may convene a 
Constitutional Assembly elected through a popular referendum called by 
20 percent of the electorate, by an absolute majority of the Plurinational 
Legislative Assembly, or by the President.150 In both countries, to enter 
into effect, constitutional amendments are subject to ratification by means 
of a popular referendum.151 
14 Conclusion
This survey of recent constitutional developments in Latin America 
illustrates a mix of tradition and innovation in several areas of society. 
On the one hand, the most innovative constitutions maintain the concept 
of family as it has been known since time immemorial in the West. On 
the other hand, on a continent deeply shaped by the Catholic religion, 
the trend to minimize its influence in the shaping of constitutional and 
legal institutions is conspicuous. Equally, there is a new resort to an en-
lightened morality and to the recovery of the ethnic element, which lies 
at the center of the most sweeping reforms concerning the distribution 
of powers, and the structure of constitutional guarantees. 
With respect to the separation of powers, on a continent where 
strong presidential power has been the historic pattern the executive 
branches of government have emerged overall even stronger after the 
latest changes in constitutional law. The legislative branches, in turn, 
have benefitted from cosmetic changes vis-à-vis the presidency, and re-
main, in general terms, as subordinated arms of the executive branch of 
149 1999 CONST. OF VENEZUELA art. 341.
150 2009 CONST. OF BOLIVIA art. 411.
151 Id. art. 411; 1999 CONST. OF VENEZUELA art. 341(4).
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government. The judicial branches have been, to put it mildly, the less 
favored of the three branches in this scheme of amendments. In fact, 
where new individual rights have been spelled out through constitutional 
reforms in the region, these rights have simply increased the docket of 
the beleaguered Latin American judiciaries.
The real effects of novelties brought about by the new philosophi-
cal background of the constitutional movements shaping recent reforms 
are yet to be seen. In most cases, such changes have thus far not been 
implemented. That is the case, for example, for the aboriginal justice 
system in Bolivia and for the new criminal procedure reform and juvenile 
criminal system in Mexico. 
In sum, Latin America is an area where changes occur often, and 
sometimes abruptly. The region has also been characterized by the do-
mino effects of reforms that take place in one jurisdiction and are then 
quickly mirrored in other jurisdictions. In that sense, the effects of the 
new trends embodied in recent constitutional activity in the region will 
not likely occur in isolation, but will be evident throughout Latin America. 
